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Year in a Word: Migration 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies. 
As we approach the end (of the year), I also considered what the word 
that came to mind most when one mentioned Brexit. For me this word 
was “migration”. As a migrant to this country myself, the issue clearly 
has some traction to me. 
Indeed, it was the overarching theme of the 2016 referendum and 
when Leave campaigners spoke of “taking back control” this was the 
context that they emphasised. Indeed, PM Theresa May has 
endeavoured to stress the element of “taking back control of our 
borders” and “setting our own immigration policy” – a stance which is 
consistent with her time at the Home Office and the “hostile 
environment” migration policy she enacted. As such, this is set to 
feature prominently with the upcoming release of the Government’s 
White Paper on post-Brexit migration policy. 
The White Paper is expected to more-or-less adopt the 
recommendations of the Migration Advisory Committee’s report into 
the matter, released in September of this year. For Theresa May this 
is coterminous with ending Freedom of Movement for EU nationals, 
so as to pursue a migration policy that does not depend upon whether 
you come from an EU country or not. Also expected to feature is a 
consultation over whether those who wish to settle in the UK will have 
to earn at least £30,000 in their job in order to qualify for permanent 
residency after 5 years. 
For the PM, such measures should serve to encourage UK-based 
businesses to train up “British workers” instead of having recourse to 
immigrant labour. Notable however, is that no mention has been 
made of reducing net migration to below 100,000 p.a., which was an 
element of the 2017 Conservative Party election Manifesto. 
Suffice to say, some things need to be said about the proposed 
approach to migration policy post-Brexit. First, is that contra to the 
PMs oft-repeated mantra of a “deal” (the other over-used word this 
year – see David Hearne’s blog on the topic here) allowing the UK to 
set its own migration policy, the Withdrawal Agreement with the EU 
will commit the UK to a minimum of 21 months transition period (and 
possibly an unspecified extension – most likely to the end of 2022) 
where the status quo ante of continued free movement of EU 
nationals (with settlement rights after 5 years) will continue to apply. 
Beyond this, whether the UK does end up ending Freedom of 
Movement will depend upon whether it ultimately wishes to stay in the 
Single Market (or not). EU negotiators have been consistent in 
regards to the UK not being able to “cherry-pick” bits of the Single 
Market that it likes and excluding others. These issues will remain 
pivotal to the negotiation of any new trade relationship post-Brexit 
(assuming that the UK doesn’t end up with “no deal”). 
Given the deep integration of our manufacturing supply chains into 
Europe, the loss of frictionless trade guaranteed by membership of 
the Single Market may yet prove a price that the UK is unable to pay 
in order for Mrs May to pursue her controlled migration dream. 
We should also note that migrants make a net financial contribution to 
the UK, paying in more than they take in the form of benefits. The UK 
is also an ageing society, and excluding migrants from low-paid 
occupations will exacerbate shortages in key sectors such as elderly 
care. Even skilled jobs such as nursing and teaching have starting 
salaries below the purported threshold of £30,000 p.a. and clamping 
down here will only exacerbate the recruitment difficulties experienced 
by the NHS for example. 
Finally, we should note that a net migration target of less than 
100,000 p.a. would only be possible if international students who 
come to study in the UK (and are treated as “migrants” for statistics 
purposes) were excluded from the figures (in 2017 alone some 
196,000 EU/international students arrived to study in the UK during 
this period).[1] Unless the Government is seriously considering 
reducing these numbers and hence threatening the viability of one of 
the UK’s most successful “export” industries in the form of Higher 
Education. 
Whilst the prospect of “training up” UK nationals to address skills gaps 
in the current climate should be welcomed, this would need to be 
resourced properly (ideally at regional level), and given the dearth of 
STEM graduates would take a good ten years to reach fruition if 
increased investment in provision in secondary schools were to 
commence now. 
In short, despite the rhetoric of controlling migration and securing our 
borders, the UK will continue to have significant need of migrants for 
the foreseeable future, and whatever Brexit outcome we end up with 
will not change that. 
 
